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I. INTRODUCTION
Physical examinations of alleged victims "play a prominent role in
many sex offense prosecutions."' Victims of sex offenses are ideally examined
by medical personnel following the attack either for treatment or to preserve
forensic evidence.2 These examinations proceed with the consent of the victims
or, in child cases, the consent of a parent or guardian. In an era of greater em-
phasis and education about sexual assault, victims are coming forward months
and even years after the time of the sexual assault.3 In delayed report cases, a
physical examination of the victim has the potential to cause more harm than
good; any evidence gathered from the victim could be attributed to normal vari-
ations, disease, or other natural sexual contact. The healing associated with the
passage of time may remove any physical evidence of penetration and allow the
defendant to argue the forensic evidence does not support the victim's claims.
Courts have grappled with the issue of the defendant's right to insist on
an examination where the state has refused to pursue its own. State ex rel. J W
v. Knight,4 a case that "captured the attention of prosecutors across the country,"
brings the debate about these examinations and their propriety into sharper fo-
cus.5 The trial court in 1 W. ordered a fifteen-year-old female to undergo a gy-
necological examination to determine hymen injury at the request of her sibling
defendant. 6 In J W the defendant sought the physical examination, in part, be-
cause there were no State findings to review.' Many defendants facing this
same circumstance have asserted a due process right to have their own experts
inspect the alleged victim for evidence.' Confusing the issue is the fact that the
United States Supreme Court has never considered whether the Due Process
I Troy Andrew Eid, A Fourth Amendment Approach to Compulsory Physical Examinations of
Sex Offense Victims, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 873, 874 (1990) (arguing that under a Fourth Amendment
analysis, defendants do not have a due process right to compel a physical examination).
2 Id. at 873.
Id. at 874. Cases where a victim comes forward months or years after the incident will be
referred to as "delayed report" cases throughout this Note.
4 679 S.E.2d 617 (W. Va. 2009).
s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia at 5, J. W.
v. Knight, 679 S.E.2d 617 (W. Va. 2009) (No. 09-191), 2009 WL 2491812. Prosecutors have a
constitutional duty to disclose their physician's findings to the defense if they contain exculpatory
evidence under the Brady doctrine.
6 To protect J.W.'s privacy as a minor sexual assault victim, she will be referred to as J.W.
throughout this note and throughout the cases discussed herein.
7 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, supra
note 5.
8 Eid, supra note 1, at 873.
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Clause is broad enough to include these compulsory examinations.9 Further, the
Supreme Court has not spoken as to whether a victim in a criminal case has a
privacy interest enabling the victim to lawfully refuse to submit to examination.
Some states, including West Virginia, have developed various methods
for dealing with such requests.'0 States' methods for determining whether to
compel a victim to undergo a physical examination at the behest of the defen-
dant vary and, without direction from the Supreme Court, have served to con-
found rather than illuminate the issue.
This Note will examine the J. W. case to provide a factual and procedur-
al background of a case in which the issue of court-ordered physical examina-
tion arose." This will highlight that the issue is not simply an academic one;
instead, it is an issue that affects both victims and defendants. The idea of com-
pulsory physical examinations is of the utmost importance both to those accused
of committing sexual offenses and the victims who courageously come forward.
Of course, the defendant has a compelling need to find exculpatory evidence;
but, many argue that "allowing compulsory examination[s] deters victims from
reporting sex crimes."l 2 Part II will explain how different states approach the
issue, focusing on the three major ways in which states balance the different
interests involved. These standards include the "compelling need" test, which
West Virginia employs; the exculpatory evidence standard, a standard that in
effect denies that a compulsory physical examination can ever be ordered by a
defendant; and the material assistance approach, which is arguably the easiest
standard to meet.
Part III will focus on the competing and conflicting interests defendants
and victims confront. This includes delving into the limited evidentiary value
that delayed physical examinations provide and touching briefly on the potential
harm that a compulsory physical examination can inflict on a victim. Finally,
Part IV will discuss whether the Supreme Court erred by denying certiorari in
J. W v. Knight and effectively denying victims a definitive answer on the bounds
of their right to privacy.'3 This section will also briefly explain how Congress
has helped the situation by passing the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA).14 Because due process rights likely do not reach broadly enough to
allow defendants to probe into a victim's body for evidence, I argue that the
Supreme Court, by inaction, is allowing the non-constitutional right of a defen-
dant to evidence to usurp the constitutional rights of victims.
9 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, supra
note 5.
10 See generally Eid, supra note 1, at 880.
" J.W. v. Knight, 679 S.E.2d 617 (W. Va. 2009).
12 Oriana Mazza, Re-examining Motions to Compel Psychological Evaluations of Sexual As-
sault Victims, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 763, 771 (2008) (arguing that defendants' rights to compel
psychological examinations of sexual assault victims should be limited).
13 J.W. v. Knight, 679 S.E.2d 617.
14 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2246 (1994).
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II. BACKGROUND-THE J.W. CASE
A. "More ofa Cult than a Fanily'"-The Curious Case ofJason Wilson
The Wilsons were an unusual family, having moved twenty times in ten
years.1s Jason Wilson, the accused, was days away from completing basic train-
ing for the United States Army when he was arrested on charges of four counts
of first degree sexual assault and one count of incest, allegedly occurring be-
tween February 2003 and May 2005.16
It all began when J.W., Jason's younger sister, was examined by Dr. Fa-
rid Hussain as part of the Mercer County Board of Education's "efforts to have
'J.W.' reintroduced to the formal education system over the objection of her
father, who had been home-schooling [her]."1 When asked by Dr. Hussain
whether she had ever been molested or sexually abused, she replied that she had
never been sexually abused.' 8 Dr. Hussain referred J.W. to a licensed psycholo-
gist, Mr. Richmond, due to perceived signs of Attention Deficit Disorder.'9
During this evaluation, J.W.'s father reported that "she had told him that she had
been sexually molested and abused by her brother, Jason . . . .,,20 During the
subsequent visits with Mr. Richmond, J.W. described horrific stories from the
family's home.2'
When she was seven years old, J.W. was told "that she would be raped
and killed and chopped up in pieces at some point in her life . . .. J.W. re-
layed stories of her then twelve-year-old brother Jason being sexually molested
by a friend of their father's when they were living in Arizona.23 J.W. was only
seven when the alleged abuse by Jason occurred.2 4 During these therapy visits,
she also revealed "several touching incidents" by Jason, but denied that there
25was any sexual penetration or intercourse. J.W.'s two young brothers were
" Steve Korris, Court asked to overturn order for exam of 15-year-old rape victim, THE WEST
VIRGINIA REcoRD, May 1, 2009, http://www.wvrecord.com/news/218763-court-asked-to-
overturn-order-for-exam-of-1 5-year-old-rape-victim.
16 Brief in Opposition of Jason Wilson, Real Party in Interest, to Petition for a Writ of Certi-
orari at 2, J. W. v. Knight, 679 S.E.2d 617 (W. Va. 2009) (No. 09-191).
17 Id.
18 Id. It is not uncommon for sexual assault victims, especially children, to change their recol-
lections of what has happened to them and to seemingly "flip-flop" on questions like this.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 See id. at 3.
22 Id.
23 Brief in Opposition of Jason Wilson, Real Party in Interest, to Petition for a Writ of Certi-
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forced to grope their sister in instances their father called lessons. 26 Further, it
came to light that J.W.'s father had physically abused all of the children when
they were growing up.27 This evidence later prompted Justice Margaret Work-
man of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to posit: "Why isn't [the
father] prosecuted?" 2 8
Mr. Richmond, as a mandatory reporter, referred the incidents to the ap-
propriate authorities. 29 When J.W. was subsequently interviewed by Sergeant
Clemons of the West Virginia State Police, J.W. reported "several incidents of
being touched inappropriately" over the years she had grown up.o She again
denied any sexual penetration.3 1 Jason eventually gave a statement admitting
"touching his sister and one incident of digital penetration" when they were
living in West Virginia. 32 J.W., in "play therapy sessions" with a member of the
State's prosecution team for sexual molestation cases, first alleged "repeated
sexual intercourse of a forcible and traumatic nature spanning six [6] years and
encompassing activities in several states."
The indictment for the State eschewed the earlier J.W. allegations of
sexual abuse and pursued Jason Wilson based on J.W.'s later disclosed claims
that Jason had repeatedly and sometimes forcibly raped her from ages six
through twelve.34 J.W. also later implicated her brother, Jeffrey Wilson, who
was also charged with sexual offenses and incest.35 The alleged assaults oc-
curred in a number of places, including the family's former residence in Arizo-
na, and allegedly continued when the family moved to West Virginia. 36  Be-
cause these allegations were reported three years later in counseling, and be-
cause J.W. "is very bashful," a physical examination of J.W. was never re-
quested by the prosecutor.37
26 See Korris, supra note 15.
27 Id.
28 Id. In response, the Prosecutor responded that she did not know why the father was not
prosecuted. Id.
29 Brief in Opposition of Jason Wilson, Real Party in Interest, to Petition for a Writ of Certi-
orari, supra note 16, at 2.
30 Id. at 3.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 4. The brief points out that both J.W. and Jason Wilson were under the age of 18 at
that time. Id.
33 Id.
34 Brief in Opposition of Jason Wilson, Real Party in Interest, to Petition for a Writ of Certi-
orari, supra note 16, at 4-5. J.W. was age nine in February 2003 and age eleven in May 2005.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, supra note 5,
at 2.
3s See Brief in Opposition of Jason Wilson, supra note 16 at 9.
36 Id. at 9.
37 See Korris, supra note 15.
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B. Jason Wilson's Defense- "Is The Child Real Shy? "38
On January 13, 2009, Jason Wilson filed a "Motion to Permit Physical
Examination of J.W."3 9 The stated reason for this motion was "'to determine if
there is any physical evidence that this fifteen-year-old (J.W.) has had repeated
traumatic intercourse. "'A0 In support of his motion, Jason offered statements by
J.W. to "various medical providers, psychologists, and investigators in which
J.W. purportedly denied that any physical penetration or intercourse had oc-
curred between Jason and herself."A In the motion, Jason requested "'a dis-
creet, confidential physical examination by a qualified medical doctor to deter-
mine if there is any evidence' of 'repeated traumatic intercourse."' 4 2 Jason con-
tended that the physical examination was "unlikely to cause any 'greater emo-
tional upset than the State has already submitted her to' through its prosecu-
tion."A3 In the motion, Jason proposed measures that he asserted would protect
the confidentiality of J.W." The results of the gynecological exam would be
reviewed in camera for evaluation of its probative value for the defense.4 5 Jason
further asserted that gynecological exams are "routinely performed" in cases
involving rape allegations.4 6 Jason finally asserted that the evidence he sought
from the gynecological examinations was not available from any other source.47
The prosecutor learned that J.W. had never had a pelvic examination, and she
was very resistant to the idea of such an exam.48 As a result, the prosecutor op-
posed the defendant's motion for a compulsory physical examination of J.W.
The trial court, after hearing arguments on the motion to permit a physi-
cal examination, concluded that "in light of the allegations" made by J.W. and
the victim's age, requiring J.W. to undergo a physical examination would not be
intrusive. 4 9 The judge observed that "the victim [was] fifteen (15) years of age
and females of that age customarily have pelvic examinations."o5 The judge
38 Id. At oral arguments in front of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals on April 29,
2009, Justice Menis Ketchum asked the prosecutor if the reason J.W. did not wish to undergo the
physical examination is because the girl was very shy.
3 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, supra
note 5, at 10.
40 Id. at 10.
41 See Knight, 679 S.E.2d at 619.
42 Id. (citation omitted).




47 Knight, 679 S.E.2d at 619.
48 Korris, supra note 15.
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granted the motion and ordered J.W. to undergo the exam. On February 3,
2009, a second order was entered which directed Dr. Huffman, a board-certified
gynecologist, to perform the physical examination, at the cost of the State.52
The State then sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the Circuit Court of Merc-
er County from enforcing its compulsory examination order.53
In support of the writ of prohibition, the State argued that the pelvic ex-
am "[would be] intrusive and would be humiliating to anyone who [had] not
experienced it." 54 The State also argued that Jason failed to demonstrate a com-
pelling reason for the examination. In rebuttal, Jason analyzed the six Delaney
factors in relation to the facts of this case.
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW: A MIXED BAG
Many states have analyzed the defendant's right to require a physical
examination of an alleged sexual assault victim under standards tied to the de-
fendant's due process rights, but there is no uniformity in the approaches being
employed.5 8 There are varied analytical approaches being used to assess when a
physical examination of the alleged victim at the behest of the defendant is ap-
propriate.5 9 Some states apply the Brady v. Maryland standard, requiring the
defendant to show the evidence garnered through an examination would exone-
rate him.o Other states use one of two types of "compelling need" tests.6 1 One
type of this standard is an ad hoc "compelling need" test, which is a balancing
approach. 6 2 The other is a factor-based "compelling need" test that "loosely
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Knight, 679 S.E.2d at 619.
54 Id. at 620.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 620-21; see State v. Delaney, 417 S.E.2d 903 (W. Va. 1992). These factors are dis-
cussed infra Part III.
5 See, e.g., Eid, supra note 1.
58 Id. The lack of uniformity in state courts' standards to determine whether a compulsory
physical examination is proper is mirrored in the current state of the law for determining when
compulsory psychological examinations should be ordered. See Mazza, supra note 12, at 764,
n. 10. "For example, there exists a judicial three-way split between states that do not allow mo-
tions to compel psychological evaluations, states that grant the defendant an absolute right to an
evaluation of the witness, and states that give trial judge's discretion to grant the motion." Id.
9 See, e.g., Eid, supra note 1.
6 See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that suppression by prosecution
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of good faith or bad faith of prosecution).
61 Eid, supra note 1, at 880.
62 Id. West Virginia employs the "compelling need" approach. See Delaney, 417 S.E.2d 903,
discussed infra Section III.
2011] 627
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balance[s] the defendant's interest in the evidence against the burden the exami-
nation would impose on the complainant." 63 A third standard is an approach
used by Kentucky, which "requires an examination when the evidence sought is
likely to help the defendant prepare for trial."6 Kentucky's standard is referred
to as the Turner "material assistance" approach.65 Other jurisdictions hold that a
trial court has no authority to order a complaining witness in a sex offense case
to submit to physical examination by the defendant's medical expert.
A. The Exculpatory Evidence Standard
Some jurisdictions base the compulsory physical examination decision
on whether the evidence sought is or would be exculpatory.6 7 This proves to be
a tough standard to meet, as the defense must show that the evidence "likely to
be obtained by a compulsory physical examination could absolutely bar a con-
viction."68 If this standard cannot be met, the court will refuse to order such an
examination without looking to any other factors.69
This standard holds little benefit for the defendant under modem sexual
assault statutes. West Virginia, for example, only requires proof of penetration,
however slight, to justify a conviction.7 0 The uncorroborated testimony of the
victim is sufficient to support a conviction.7 1 Since a negative forensic exami-
nation would not disprove the allegation under the West Virginia statute, the
exculpatory evidence showing could, arguably, never be met. The exculpatory
evidence standard is more a rule of refusal than a rule of approval. People v.
NokeS72 illustrates this point.
In People v. Nokes, California adopted the exculpatory evidence stan-
dard in a tragic case involving the defendant's own children and several oth-
ers.73 The defendants filed a motion to compel the children to undergo physical
examinations. 4 The children had not been examined by any medical expert.
63 Eid, supra note 1, at 880.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 881.
66 See People v. Lopez, 800 N.E.2d 1211 (111. 2003).
67 Eid, supra note 1, at 884.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-1 (2010).
71 Id.
72 183 Cal. App. 3d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
73 See id.
74 Id. at 47 1.
75 Id. at 468. Jay Smith, a lawyer representing the children in another matter appeared at the
hearing in an attempt to defeat the motion. Smith stated at the hearing
628 [Vol. 113
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 113, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss2/11
ONCE, TWICE, THREE TIMES A VICTIM
In Nokes, the California appellate court held that nothing in prior case law sug-
gests "that a criminal defendant has the right to compel an intrusion into the
body of his or her victim for the purpose of attempting to obtain allegedly ex-
culpatory evidence."7 Only the certainty of the exculpatory quality of the re-
sults could justify the physical intrusion that certainty is unattainable since the
results could not be known before the fact.
B. Kentucky's "Material Assistance" Approach
Kentucky has the lowest standard to compel a complainant to undergo a
physical examination. 7 7 Kentucky's "material assistance" approach, as enun-
ciated in Turner v. Commonwealth, states that a defendant is entitled "as a
matter of due process and fairness," to "have the alleged victim examined by an
independent gynecologist in preparation for trial."79 In Turner, the victim was
only four years old, and was the daughter of the defendant.o A gynecologist
testified as an expert witness that "the child, at the time of her examination, had
injuries to the hymenal ring" in various spots.8' The gynecologist further testi-
fied that "each of the injuries had healed, and had formed scar tissue."82
Because of the healing, the gynecologist testified that she could not de-
termine when the injuries were inflicted. The gynecologist testified that the
"injury to the superior position of the ring would likely be caused by digital
penetration or by the insertion of foreign objects, but that tears in the posterior
section of the ring were probably the result of penile penetration." 84 Regardless
of this testimony, or perhaps because of it, the Kentucky Supreme Court held
that the defendant should have the chance to have his own expert examine the
young victim, so that he might "offer evidence to contradict that offered by the
I talked to [the son] just about whether or not he was concerned or upset about
the possibility of a medical examination. He said that he was. He said that --
we did not get into the details of it but basically a kind of examination that
would be an examination of his bottom would make him think of what he'd
gone through before. He was concerned about that. He thought he would feel
emotionally upset if that happened . .. [The son] was firm, said to me in his
own words that he was very upset about the idea of the examination, that's
why I appeared in court and asked for an opportunity to oppose it.
Id. at 474.
76 Id. at 478.
77 See Eid, supra note 1, at 881.
78 767 S.W.2d 557 (Ky. 1988).
7 Id. at 559.
80 Id. at 559.
81 Id. at 558.
82 Id.
83 Id.
8 Turner, 767 S.W.2d at 559.
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Commonwealth as to whether there were, in fact, any injuries to the hymenal
ring."85 Because the examination of the alleged victim by an independent expert
would have been of "material assistance" to the defendant in his cross-
examination of the prosecution's expert, the conviction of the defendant was
overturned.
C. West Virginia's "Compelling Need" Test
The West Virginia "compelling need" test was adopted in State v. Dela-
ney.87 In Delaney, defendant Denzil Delaney appealed his sexual assault con-
viction in part due to an alleged error on the part of the trial court denying his
request for a physical examination of the victims. 88 In Delaney, the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court affirmed the longstanding right of a defendant to "present
evidence on his own behalf and to confront adverse witnesses," yet noted that
"pretrial discovery is generally within the discretion of the trial court." 9 The
prosecuting attorney urged the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to
adopt the standard set forth in a Rhode Island case, State v. Ramos,9 0 which
held:
The practice of granting physical examinations of criminal wit-
nesses must be approached with utmost judicial restraint and re-
spect for an individual's dignity. In determining whether to or-
der an independent medical examination, the trial justice should
consider (1) the complainant's age, (2) the remoteness in time
of the alleged criminal incident to the proposed examination, (3)
the degree of intrusiveness and humiliation associated with the
procedure, (4) the potentially debilitating physical effects of
such an examination, and (5) any other relevant considera-
tions.9'
Further, the State urged the court to "balance the defendant's right to
discover possible evidence against the victims' privacy interests in ordering
another physical examination." 92 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
agreed with the State, calling the Ramos standard a "reasonable method of ba-
lancing the defendant's need for the examinations against the victim's right to
85 Eid, supra note 1, at 881 (quoting Turner, 767 S.W.2d at 559).
86 Id.
8 417 S.E.2d 903 (W. Va. 1992).
88 Id. at 906.
89 Id. (citing State v. Audia, 301 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1983)).
9 553 A.2d 1059 (R.I. 1989).
91 Id. at 1062.
92 Delaney, 417 S.E.2d at 907.
630 [Vol. 113
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privacy."9 3 The court held that the party requesting the additional physical or
psychological examinations must put forth evidence that "he has a compelling
need or reason" for the additional examinations.9 4 After the compelling need is
identified by the party, the trial court is to apply a modified Ramos test.9 5 The
factors to be considered by the trial court include:
(1) the nature of the examination requested and the intrusive-
ness inherent in that examination; (2) the victim's age; (3) the
resulting physical and/or emotional effects of the examination
on the victim; (4) the probative value of the examination to the
issue before the court; (5) the remoteness in time of the exami-
nation to the alleged criminal act; and (6) the evidence already
available for the defendant's use.9 6
The court in Delaney affirmed the trial court's decision denying the de-
fendant's request for physical examinations of the alleged victims, three girls as
young as eight-years-old at the time. 97 The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals stated that the judge made the correct decision "in light of the victims'
tender ages, the intrusiveness and humiliation associated with a gynecological
examination of the three young girls, and the remoteness in time from the inci-
dents in question to the proposed examinations."
The court made the point that the probative value of the discoverable
evidence wanes with time. The court noted the testimony by the State's expert:
"physical symptoms of sexual assault can dissipate in as little as six months."99
Several years had passed since the alleged assaults at issue in Delaney.0 o In
refusing the defendant's request for a psychological examination, the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated that "[g]iven the effect of a probing men-
tal interrogation on children of their tender years, we believe the trial court was
correct in ruling that, in essence, the probative value to the appellant was out-






9 Delaney, 417 S.E.2d at 907.
9 Id.
100 Id. at 908. The court in Delaney uses similar reasoning for denying the defendant's motion
for an additional psychological test. The Court states that the defendant failed to present any
reason to justify the additional psychological examination. "Since we cannot find that the appel-
lant's need is greater or more compelling than the burden it would impose on the victims, the trial
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reiterated and affirmed in State ex rel. J. W v. Knight, although for the first time
the court held the defendant had satisfied the "compelling need" test. 0 2
D. The Delaney Factors as Applied to the J.W. Case
Jason Wilson, the defendant, used the six Delaney factors to convince
the trial judge, and later the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, that the
balance of the Delaney test came out in favor of an order compelling a physical
examination of J.W. 0 3 Looking to the first factor, "the nature of the requested
examination and its inherent intrusiveness," Jason argued that because of the
limited nature of the pelvic examination, the fact that the examination would be
performed by a female physician, and the fact that women regularly undergo
extensive gynecological examinations for health reasons, the examination was
not intrusive in nature. 104 Looking to the second factor, which "requires a con-
sideration of the victim's age," Jason pointed out that the alleged victim was
fifteen-years-old at that time. 0 5 With the third factor, "which requires consider-
ation of the lasting physical and/or emotional effects of the examination," the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals accepted Jason's assertion that a gy-
necological examination of JW. would not cause any long term effects, even if
J.W. might experience embarrassment as the result of being required to undergo
the examination.106
Jason satisfied the fourth factor, "the probative value of the examina-
tion" by asserting that the potential evidence was crucial to his defense.' 07 He
intended to "rely on such evidence to argue that the charges brought against him
by the State are baseless." 08 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
points out that this is a risk for Jason, as the discovered evidence might "incul-
pate, rather than exculpate him."' 09 The fifth factor delineated in Delaney
"looks to the remoteness in time of the examination with reference to the alleged
criminal act.""o In this case, the physical examination would take place four
years after the alleged offenses occurred."' The prosecution argued that "it is
prepared to introduce evidence that after a period of only six months indicia of
sexual trauma may no longer exist.""l2 Finally, for the sixth Delaney factor,
102 J.W. v. Knight, 679 S.E.2d 617, 618 (W. Va. 2009).
103 Id.
14 Id. at 620--21.
1os Id. at 62 1.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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which looks to "the availability of evidence from other sources," Jason asserted
that there is no other obtainable evidence to show that the charges are base-
less.'1 Based on the Delaney factors, the court found that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in considering these factors and finding in favor of Jason's
request.1 4 Accordingly, it refused to issue the requested writ of prohibition
against the order, in effect affirming the trial court's order for a physical exami-
nation." 5
The physical examination of J.W. never occurred. The prosecution,
upon losing this motion, offered a plea deal to Jason. The prospect of a physical
examination changed the course of this case.
IV. VICTIMS AND DEFENDANTS ALIKE ARE IMPACTED BY COMPULSORY
PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS
The United States Supreme Court has held there is no general right to
discovery in criminal cases."16 The J W. case raises the question of "whether a
state trial court, at the behest of the accused, has authority to compel ... a minor
rape victim[] to submit to a penetrating pelvic examination for the purpose of
determining the condition of her hymen."I17 This issue is of great importance to
both prosecutors and criminal defendants accused of sexual assault.'"8 And of
course, this issue is of even greater importance to victims of sexual assault." 9
A. The Effect of Physical Examinations on Victims
"Most victims of sexual assault are women," and most victims of sexual
assault that undergo post-assault physical examinations are women.120 Sexual
assault victims often suffer from both psychological and physical injury.121 And
113 Id.
I14 Knight, 679 S.E.2d at 622.
" Id. At this point, Wendy Murphy became involved. Wendy Murphy is a former prosecutor
who specializes in child abuse and sex crimes cases. Mrs. Murphy became "counsel of record"
for J.W. and wrote the Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the West Virginia Supreme Court, filed on
behalf of J.W.
116 Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 US 545, 559 (1977).
117 Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, supra note
5, at 5.
118 Prosecutors rely on physical evidence from the victim to persuade the jury that the offense
took place. Defendants rely on physical evidence to provide exculpatory evidence.
ll9 Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, supra note
5, at 5.
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89% of rape victims in one study agreed that the post-rape medical exam was
traumatizing. 122
A forensic medical exam can add to the psychological injury and the
physical discomfort of the victim. 123 A forensic medical examination is stress-
ful, time-consuming and invasive.124 The victim will have had "an extremely
difficult and sometimes violent or terrifying experience and is likely to find the
examination intrusive."' 25 As victims, children are "even less able than adults to
tolerate medical examination and testing after being victimized."l 26 Psycholo-
gists have taken note of potential long-term psychological problems in very
young children who undergo examinations; however, this risk lessens in the
adolescent years.127
Medical protocols, if followed, can lessen the harmful effects, but will
not remove them entirely. Procedures should be put in place to protect the pri-
vacy of the victim during the examination.128 Physicians also encourage seda-
tion or anesthesia when the victim being examined is a small child and particu-
larly susceptible to emotional trauma.12 9 During the collection of forensic spe-
cimens, clinicians should take at least two swabs of whatever forensic speci-
mens are obtained to avoid the necessity of re-examination at a later date.' 3 0 But
this type of evidence collection procedure cannot be followed when the exami-
nation occurs much later than the sexual offense.131 The examination itself may
involve taking tissue samples; removing fluids and scrapings from the walls of
122 See Rebecca Campbell & Sheela Raja, Secondary Victimization of Rape Victims: Insights
from Mental Health Professionals Who Treat Survivors of Violence, 14 VIOLENCE & VICTIMs 3, 3
(1999).
Secondary victimization refers to behaviors and attitudes of social service
providers that are "victim-blaming" and insensitive, and which traumatize vic-
tims of violence who are being served by these agencies. Institutional practic-
es and values that place the needs of the organization above the needs of
clients or patients are implicated in the problem.
Id.
123 Carole Jenny, Forensic Examinations: The Role of the Physician as "Medical Detective, " in
EVALUATION OF THE SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILD: A MEDICAL TEXTBOOK AND PHOTOGRAPHIC




127 See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 1-29, State of West Virginia v. Jason Wilson,
Criminal Action No. 08-F-143-DK, Circuit Court of Mercer County, West Virginia (Feb. 3,
2009).
128 Jenny, supra note 123, at 80.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 85.
131 When physical examinations are delayed, physical evidence is unlikely to be uncovered.
This is discussed supra Part III.B.
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the vagina; and, documenting, through photographic records, an intimate part of
the female anatomy.
These are the noted effects when the examination is by consent. There
simply have been no studies of the effects on a victim when she is forced to
undergo an examination at the insistence of her alleged attacker.132 Intuitively,
the psychological trauma associated with the examination could be similar to the
psychological trauma of the initial attack. The victim is forced into a subser-
vient position to the court, much as she was originally forced into a subservient
position to her attacker; this could discourage her participation in the prosecu-
tion of the case.
This concern is illustrated in the case of J. W. J.W., from the record, a
bashful young girl of fifteen, personally opposed a physical examination ordered
by the court. The State of West Virginia struck a plea bargain with the defen-
dant, possibly to spare her the insult of undergoing a forced examination or the
litigation that might ensue if the court were to enforce its ruling against her.
The granting of a motion to compel a physical examination against the wishes of
the victim almost certainly carries the risk that it will have an "extortionate val-
ue" for the defendant in obtaining a more favorable outcome without risking a
trial.
B. Physical Examinations are Often Ineffective, Especially in Delayed Re-
port Cases
Medical evidence shows that the results of any delayed examination
will often produce inconclusive, if not incorrect, results. The effectiveness of
physical examinations of rape victims is questionable at best. Many physical
examinations of rape victims occur months after the sexual abuse has taken
place.' 33 In most child sexual abuse cases, the disclosure of the abuse occurrs
weeks to months after the last episode of sexual abuse, so the physical examina-
tion is often delayed.'34 The physical examination is always delayed from a
132 But Wendy Murphy explains the harm to victims quite well, noting that courts that order
physical examinations of victims show:
[A] serious lack of appreciation for the individualized nature of the harm
caused by sexual violence. It is not the physical pain, but the fact that an in-
trusion into one's personal body parts is "unwanted" that defines the profound
harm to the self and the critical need for law to respect the concept of consent
as the defining line between pleasure and crime.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, supra note 5, at
12.
133 S. Jean Emans, Physical Examination of the Child and Adolescent, in EVALUATION OF THE
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medical standpoint.' 35 The healing of "genital and anal injuries usually occur[s]
very rapidly," and residual indications may not be present if several days or
weeks have passed since the incident occurred.13 6 Further, "[t]he possibility of
recovering evidence decreases quickly."' 37 For example, sperm has been shown
to persist in the vagina after intercourse for at most seventeen days.'3 8 If any
evidence is to be found, it is unlikely to be found by a physical examination
occurring after seventy-two hours.139
Examinations with "normal" results occur frequently, even in cases
where the sexual abuse has been substantiated or admitted by the accused.140
Perhaps because of the time lapse between the abuse and examinations, the ex-
aminations of most children with substantiated sexual abuse are considered
medically "normal" and do not show evidence of sexual abuse at all.141 The
percentage of normal examinations has been reported at 70-90% of child com-
plainants, depending on "the case mix, the age of the patients, the definition of
'normal' versus abnormal and the examiners." 4 2 Even where the accused gives
an actual description of vaginal penetration, normal genital findings have been
reported in 39% of the victims.14 3 Specific findings of physical injury are more
common in girls "for whom the perpetrator has acknowledged penetration," yet
even this group may not show specific injury.'" The likelihood of detecting
evidence of penetration, nongenital trauma, or genital trauma "increases with
the age of the patient, in part, because adolescents are more likely to have been
victims of a rape by a stranger or acquaintance." 4 5 These cases involve more
forceful trauma with greater physical consequences than that generally found in
incest or familial sexual abuse cases.14 6 And as the age of the victim increases,
so does the likelihood that the victim has engaged in sexual activity with con-
sent.
Old medical doctrines have yielded to new research in understanding
the limitations of physical examinations in delayed cases of sexual assault or
sexual abuse. Historically, the hymen has been used as an indicator of sexual
135 Even an examination that occurs within a day or two of a sexual assault can be inconclusive.
Many factors diminish the evidence that can be obtained, such as if the victim showers before the
exam, uses the bathroom, or changes clothes.
136 Emans, supra note 133, at 76.
13 Jenny, supra note 123, at 80.
138 Id.
"39 Id.
140 Emans, supra note 133, at 60.
141 Id.
142 Id.
'" Id. at 76.
145 Id.
146 See Emans, supra note 133.
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activity or sexual abuse. 4 7 The damage or absence of a hymen was explained
by the conclusion that the female had been sexually active.14 8 The presence of
an intact hymen traditionally meant that no penetration had occurred.14 9 Its ab-
sence or damage, however, may occur from many instances other than inter-
course. 5 0 Although, as an early study once stated, "all girls are born with hy-
mens," there is a great deal of variety in what type of hymen a practitioner will
consider "normal."151
Controversy now surrounds using hymenal dimensions to verify sexual
assault or sexual abuse.15 2 For example, the evidence that a clinician can gather
will be greatly altered depending on the person's position during the examina-
tion, "the amount of hymenal tissue present, the degree and length of time of
applied traction, the amount of relaxation" and the "type" of hymen. 5 3 Also, a
number of medical conditions "may present a challenge to the clinician and may
be initially diagnosed as sexual abuse."l 54 Thus, many practitioners warn that
"an enlarged [hymenal] opening may be helpful if other signs, symptoms, beha-
vioral indicators, or disclosure are present," but the use of hymenal dimensions
"should not be used as the sole indicator of a sexual abuse diagnosis."
These types of examinations are, from a clinician's viewpoint, fraught
with emotional trauma for the victim.156 Clinicians also speculate that the phys-
ical examination "may bring back memories of previous genital contact" and
may make behavior outbursts or difficulty sleeping the night after the examina-
tion possible.157 It stands to reason that this trauma may be more pronounced in
younger victims.
The justification for permitting these examinations is undermined by re-
cent medical research. These exams do not produce reliable evidence of guilt or
innocence under current medical techniques and understanding. The passage of
time between the attack and the examination substantially lessens the likelihood
any evidence will be found that could be linked to the accused, particularly if
14 Id. at 63. The author noted that "signs consistent with acute sexual abuse have included
hematomas ... lacerations of the hymen, perihymen and posterior fourchette. Signs of previous
sexual abuse have included hymenal remnants, scars, and transections." Id.
148 See Nancy D. Kellogg et al., Genital Anatomy in Pregnant Adolescents: "Normal" Does
Not Mean "Nothing Happened," 113 J. OF AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICs 67,67,69(2004).
149 See id.
I5o Id.
151 See Emans, supra note 133, at 62.
152 Id. at 63-64.
153 Id. at 64.
154 Id. at 65. The possible conditions are lichen sclerosus, urethral prolapse, failure of midline
fusine, herpes zoster, Crohn's disease, dermatitis, psoriasis, and accidental genital trauma to name
a few. Id.
155 See Emans, supra note 133, at 64 (emphasis added).
1s6 Jenny, supra note 123, at 80.
' Id. at 75.
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the victim had consenting partners in the interval. This is a particular concern in
cases which are reported late, as is increasingly common.
For example, a teenager or a young adult in her twenties may report
sexual abuse by a parent that occurred when she was eight to twelve years old.
An examination of the hymen or vaginal area of a sexually-active twenty-year-
old will provide no information that is corroborative or un-corroborative of the
victim's statement about what happened a decade earlier. Consider that in one
study, only two of thirty-six pregnant adolescents had genital changes diagnos-
tic of penetration trauma.158
Nor is the absence of observable changes probative on the defendant's
innocence in the delayed report case. No observable changes may simply be
nothing more than the result of the healing process. The finding of guilt or in-
nocence in delayed report cases almost always will come down to corroborative
witnesses, credibility determinations, and admissions and statements made dur-
ing the course of the investigation. The medical examination, if done by con-
sent or by order of the court, will yield nothing more than ambivalent results or
unintelligible results in the delayed report case. 1 9
C. The Hypothetical Delayed Physical Examination ofJ. W
The suspect probative value of evidence from a physical examination in
a delayed report case argues strongly against ordering such examinations in the
circumstances the court confronted in J W. J.W. was fifteen-years-old at the
time the court ordered the examination. The last sexual contact she alleged be-
tween her brother and herself of a forcible, traumatic nature was three years
earlier. She also had alleged forcible intercourse with a second brother during
the same time period. There was absolutely no chance a gynecological exami-
nation would reveal any acute changes that could be linked to the defendant
alone. Nor would the presence or absence of a hymen in a fifteen-year-old be
conclusive of a defendant's guilt or innocence. West Virginia does not require
vaginal penetration to establish sexual assault. Like most states, penetration,
"however slight," is sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt. 160 Jason Wil-
son's motion should have been denied, irrespective of the constitutional issue
confronted relating to the victim's fundamental right to privacy and bodily inte-
grity.
158 See Kellogg et al., supra note 148.
1 Rape Shield statutes, such as that embodied in West Virginia Code section 61-8B-l 1(b)
(2009), would also be implicated by these examinations in delayed report cases. The victim may
be reporting sexual misconduct that occurred a decade earlier. She may be a young adult who is
sexually active. The findings of an examination that showed sexual activity, such as the absence
of a hymen or other signs, even previous pregnancy, almost always would call into question the
admissibility of the evidence of her sexual activity with other consenting partners under the Rape
Shield protections.
16 W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-l(7) (2009).
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V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COLLISION BETWEEN THE VICTIM's FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT AND THE ACCUSED'S DISCOVERY RIGHTS
An oft-repeated statement echoes the dilemma of accused sexual of-
fenders: "[i]t must be remembered, that [rape] is an accusation easily to be made
and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, though
never so innocent."' 6 1 If the State had the right to "force" sexual assault victims
to undergo physical examinations to generate a case, it might seem fair that de-
fendants would enjoy the same right when generating a defense. But the State
does not have the authority to compel victims of sexual assault to undergo phys-
ical examinations. Technically, victims are not "ordered, forced or compelled to
submit to [gynecological] examinations during the [course of] criminal investi-
gations," but the State can refuse to prosecute the offense if the victim refuses to
consent to the examination. 162 Individuals have a "fundamental right to refuse
such a deeply personal intrusion at the behest of the government." 63 Yet, indi-
viduals often consent to the examination because they want the case to be prose-
cuted.'" So it is true that "just because a rape victim can and often does submit
to a pelvic examination during a law enforcement investigation, she is not man-
dated to do so."165 To many, especially victims, this distinction is important.
The United States Supreme Court has spoken to the issue of when the accused
must endure intrusions into his bodily integrity; in these cases the State has an
overriding interest, under its police power, in doing so.' 66 Congress, in passing
the Violence Against Women Act, helped to establish a federal policy of en-
couraging immediate physical examinations. 16 7 Although this does not solve the
problem of delayed examinations, if more victims are encouraged to undergo
physical examinations early, the likelihood that they will later be subjected to a
court order compelling a physical examination becomes very unlikely.
A. The Accused Must Endure Intrusions into his Bodily Integrity: Why not
the Victim?
The United States Supreme Court has spoken on the issue of the reason-
ableness of intrusions into the fundamental right of bodily integrity of a criminal
defendant. In Schmerber v. California, the defendant received treatment in the
161 Mazza, supra note 12, at 763 (quoting Rice v. State, 217 N.W. 697, 699 (Wis. 1928)).
162 Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, supra note




166 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
167 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2246 (1994).
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hospital for injuries he sustained in an auto accident.'68 A police officer at the
hospital directed a physician to withdraw blood from Schmerber to test his
blood alcohol content.'69 Schmerber objected to the blood test, but it was per-
formed over his objections.o70 The Supreme Court held that the test did not vi-
olate Schmerber's right under the Fourth Amendment to be free of unreasonable
searches and seizures.' 71
In 1985, the Supreme Court undertook the question of whether the sur-
gical removal of evidence without the surgery subject's consent, for use in a
criminal prosecution, is per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.172 The Court answered the question in the affirmative.77 The
surgery to remove a bullet without the consent of the accused, for prosecutorial
purposes, was too severe an intrusion to be permissible under the Fourth
Amendment. 174
The Supreme Court's wary attitude toward bodily intrusions to seek
evidence is illustrated in its decision in Ronchin v. Calhfornia.'75 In that case, a
suspect, expecting to be arrested, swallowed narcotic capsules when he was
approached by law enforcement officers.176 The officers demanded that the
suspect's stomach be pumped against his will in a hospital.' 77 The Court called
the pumping of his stomach offensive even to the most "hardened sensibilities"
and deemed the practice to be unreasonable and thus unconstitutional.178 The
defendant has been protected against compulsory physical examinations that are
deemed too intrusive in sexual offense prosecutions.
168 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 759.
171 Id. at 772. The factors to be considered are:
[T]he reliability of the method to be employed, the seriousness of the underly-
ing criminal offense and society's consequent interest in obtaining a convic-
tion, the strength of law enforcement suspicions that evidence of crime will be
revealed, the importance of the evidence sought, and the possibility that the
evidence may be recovered by alternative means less violative of Fourth
Amendment freedoms. These considerations must, in turn, be balanced against
the severity of the proposed intrusion. Thus, the more intense, unusual, pro-
longed, uncomfortable, unsafe or undignified the procedure contemplated, or
the more it intrudes upon the essential standards of privacy, the greater must
be the showing for the procedure's necessity.
Eid, supra note 1, at 898-99 (quoting People v. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d 284, 298 (1978)).
172 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
1 Id. at 766.
174 Id.
1s 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
176 Id. at 166.
177 Id
17 Id. at 172.
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In People v. Scott, the Supreme Court of California reversed a guilty
verdict because of harmful error of a substantial invasion of "dignity and priva-
cy" of the defendant."' In Scott, the complainant developed an infection called
trichomoniasis, an infection that is primarily transmitted through sexual inter-
course. 8 0 The complainant alleged that she had not had intercourse with anyone
except the defendant, her father.'
Just before trial, the People moved to have the defendant physically
tested for trichomoniasis to determine whether he had been the donor of the
infection to his daughter.' 82 The problem was that the "routine test for tricho-
moniasis consisted . .. of a manual massage of the prostate gland administered
through the rectum and causing a discharge of a sample of semen."8  The de-
fendant objected to the test, but the trial court ordered the examination, which
was subsequently conducted.184 The results of the test were negative for tricho-
moniasis, except that they revealed the possibility of a symptom associated with
trichomoniasis in the form of an inflamed prostate.' 85 These results were intro-
duced at trial and the defendant was convicted.18 6
On appeal, the Supreme Court of California found merit in the defen-
dant's contention that the test "constituted an unreasonable search and sei-
zure." 87 The court said it was "well settled that unjustified intrusions beneath
the body's surface may violate a suspect's 'due process' rights guaranteed by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." 8 8 The court further looked to the
Fourth Amendment's "solicitude for personal dignity and privacy," indicating
that searches of the body that are intrusive must be founded on a clear indication
that evidence will be found.'89 Finally, the court looked to the degree of intru-
sion, noting minor examinations, such as blood tests, are routine, but that more
substantial invasions must be subject to higher scrutiny.190 The court stated that
the "human body is not . . . a sanctuary in which evidence may be concealed
with impunity," but it was entitled to a high degree of protection and the factors
the court should consider militated in favor of the defendant's privacy rights in
this particular case.' 9 '
179 People v. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d 284, 294 (1978).





185 Scott, 21 Cal. 3d at 298.
186 Id. at 284.
187 Id. at 290.
188 Id. at 291.
'" Id. at 292.
190 Id.
191 Scott, 21 Cal. 3d at 292.
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For the criminal defendant, the United States Supreme Court rulings il-
lustrate that physical searches, physical examinations, and even the removal of
body fluids do not conflict with the defendant's constitutional protections so
long as the Fourth Amendment requirements are satisfied192 A defendant's
fundamental rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments yield to the
superior interests of the State in its police power and enforcement of its laws.
The court also has made it clear that physical examinations may be required of
persons other than those under reasonable suspicion of committing crimes. The
analysis in those circumstances has been one of balancing the governmental
interests versus the privacy interests.19 3
B. The Compelling Governmental Interest in the Enforcement of its Laws
is not Present When the Victim's Fundamental Right to Privacy is Being
Invaded to Satisfy the Defendant's Discovery Needs
J W, Delaney, and courts following this approach apply the "compel-
ling need" inquiry, which basically balances the defendant's interest in the evi-
dence against the psychological or physical burden of the examination imposed
upon the complainant.194 At least one state has taken the position that the de-
fendant would only be entitled to an examination when he could show that the
evidence is qualified for disclosure under Brady v. Maryland.'95 Many courts
have rejected the notion that a criminal defendant could ever obtain an order
requiring a victim to submit to a physical examination absent some direct legis-
lative authority. 196
All of these decisions fail to discuss the fundamental constitutional right
of the rape or sexual assault victim to protect his or her bodily integrity. There
are two types of due process privacy interests that have been recognized by the
United States Supreme Court: (1) "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters" and (2) "the interest in independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions." 9 7 An unwanted gynecological examination ar-
guably implicates both of these types of due process privacy interests because it
commands the extraction of information from a private body
part, and deprives [the Victim] of the ability to control who has
access to her intimate body, thus threatens her interest in con-
192 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
19 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); United States v. Ward, 131
F.3d 335 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that Violence Against Women's Act provisions authorizing the
forced HIV testing of inmates do not violate Fourth Amendment).
194 See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 575 N.E.2d 1326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); People v. Melendez, 80
P.3d 883 (Colo. App. 2003).
1 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
196 Clark v. Virginia, 551 S.E.2d 642 (Va. 2001).
197 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
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trolling the release of confidential information, but also en-
croaches on her fundamental right to individual autonomy and
authority over the self.198
The right to privacy includes a fundamental right to bodily integrity.1 99
It is a right "deeply-rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 2 00 "The Fourth
Amendment protects 'expectations of privacy'. . . individual's legitimate expec-
tations that in certain places and at certain times he has 'the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.",201 And the Supreme Court has said that the question of whether the in-
dividual's privacy interests are outweighed by society's interests in conducting
the procedure is to be considered on a case-by-case basis. 20 2
This right may have to yield in those limited circumstances when a
compelling governmental interest is at stake.20 3 There is no Supreme Court au-
thority for the notion that this fundamental right of bodily integrity must yield to
the discovery needs of a criminal defendant when the United States Constitution
accords no discovery rights to the accused.2 04 These decisions focus more on
the process by which the decision is made and fail to analyze the request for an
examination under the "strict scrutiny" standards-a "must" when a fundamen-
tal right is being tread upon.2 05
The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that a State will not
deprive "any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law."20 6
It has long been recognized that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments guaran-
198 Brief in Opposition of Jason Wilson, Real Party in Interest, to Petition for a Writ of Certi-
orari at 15, J. W v. Knight, 679 S.E.2d 617 (W. Va. 2009) (09-191).
199 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994); See also Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, 528
F.3d 762, 771-72 (10th Cir. 2008).
200 Seegmiller, 528 F.2d at 767 (quoting Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775 (2003)).
201 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
202 Id. at 760.
203 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001).
204 Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).
205 See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 767-75 (2003); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 840 (1998).
206 The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The Fourteenth Amendment, in relevant part states "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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tee more than a "fair process." 2 07 These Amendments create a protective shield
that bars certain governmental action regardless of the procedures used to im-
plement them.208 Fundamental rights "deeply-rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition" may not be infringed upon by government action, no matter what pro-
cedural safeguards are provided.209 Only when the State shows a compelling
governmental interest and narrowly tailors its intrusion to advance that interest
may courts require a person's fundamental right to yield.210
J.W. and all citizens have a fundamental right to protection of their bo-
dily integrity from government intrusion.21  Forcing children to undergo intru-
sive medical examinations at the request of a defendant is bad policy and, more
importantly, an unconstitutional intrusion. Traditional Fourth Amendment ana-
lyses of the competing interests at stake miss the mark. Courts, in Fourth
Amendment cases, determine the reasonableness of the search or seizure by
balancing the intrusion into the person's privacy with a legitimate governmental
interest being promoted by the search.212 The competing governmental interest
that justifies the intrusion typically relates to the exercise of the police power in
enforcing criminal statutes.213 As the United States Supreme Court explained in
Brinegar, the probable cause requirement is a fact-based determination that
represents a compromise between the competing interests of enforcing the laws
and protecting the individual right to privacy.214
That analysis may work when deciding whether an accused may be
forced to donate blood, provide hair samples, or submit to fingerprint analysis in
the context of a criminal prosecution. 215 Even in police power cases, however,
there is a limit to what the Fourth Amendment will allow in terms of the intru-
sion of the accused's person. The interests in human dignity and privacy, which
the Fourth Amendment protects, forbid any intrusions on the mere chance that
desired evidence will be obtained. As the United States Supreme Court ex-
plained in Schmerber, in the absence of a clear indication that, in fact, evidence
supporting the police power and enforcement of the laws will be found, the fun-
damental human interest of privacy and human dignity require law enforcement
officials to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear.216
207 Certainly it is interesting that the same constitutional amendment that gives a victim her
right to privacy has been used to take away that right in due process issues.
208 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 840.
209 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 775.
210 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-21 (1997).
211 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994); see e.g., Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, 528
F.3d 762, 770-71 (10th Cir. 2008).
212 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001).
213 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
214 Id.
215 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
216 384 U.S. at 769-70.
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An intrusive physical examination at the request of the defendant does
not implicate a compelling governmental interest of commensurate importance
to the police power or the enforcement of the laws. It is true the United States
Supreme Court has recognized that there may be "special needs" empowering
the State to require those not under suspicion of criminal conduct to submit to
intrusive examinations. 217 But, the Supreme Court has never ruled that the ac-
cused may step into the shoes of the State and assert compelling government
interest to serve his own discovery needs in a criminal prosecution.
The State's interest in enforcing its law and its exercise of police power
are constitutionally-based. The defendant or accused in a criminal case, howev-
er, has no general constitutional right to discovery.2 18 The accused is entitled to
the presumption of innocence throughout his proceedings. 2 19 Of course, this
presumption is in conflict with the presumption that a complainant is telling the
truth. The olden days of intense scrutiny of a victim complainant are largely
over;220 therefore, it is paradoxical to say that a victim is presumed to be truthful
but the accused is presumed to be innocent. The accused's constitutional right
to discovery is limited to those circumstances in which the state or the govern-
ment entity holds or is in possession of exculpatory evidence and fails to dis-
close that evidence to the accused.22 1
The flaw in the case involving J.W. and in other cases that have dis-
cussed this issue from other jurisdictions is that there has been no application of
the "strict scrutiny" analysis required when a fundamental right is at stake. The
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari of the J W. case was a mistake, as the Su-
preme Court should speak to this issue and breathe life into the victim's right of
privacy in a sexual offense case.
C. The Conflicting Interests Will be Eased by the VA WA in Cases Where
Recent Abuse is Alleged
The unreliability of the medical results in delayed report cases does not
lessen the dilemma for the accused. In the absence of a physical examination,
he must trust his fate to credibility determinations by the jury when there might
have been physical evidence that could have supported his denials of involve-
ment. Errors in a credibility case are always present. The articulate, guilty de-
fendant may go free. The inarticulate, innocent defendant may face long con-
finement. The issue arises from a concern for basic fairness: Would not society
217 See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
218 Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).
219 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970). Moreover, the accused has an absolute right to
have his defenses heard.
220 See Eid, supra note 1, at 899.
221 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963).
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be better served if more science rather than passion was introduced into the
process by which sexual assault cases are decided?
The answer is in the affirmative and Congress has responded. When it
enacted the VAWA of 1994 it established a federal policy of encouraging, not
discouraging, forensic medical evaluations of sexual assault victims. 2 22 The
VAWA accomplishes this federal policy by providing the states with a set of
incentives, encouraging them to enact training programs for medical providers
in performing medical examinations, especially children.2 23 It provides funding
for this training and requires states receiving the funds to enact their own sta-
tutes that guarantee each victim of sexual assault a free forensic medical exami-
nation.224 States may not require the alleged victim of a sexual assault to partic-
ipate in the criminal justice system or to cooperate with law enforcement in or-
der to receive the forensic medical examination. Nor can a State punish her for
her refusal to undergo examination by abandoning the prosecution if she should
choose to pursue it.2 25
However, the VAWA and the state statutes that are enforcing and ad-
vancing the policy enunciated therein do not address the delayed report case.
The guaranteed right to a forensic medical examination is limited to those cir-
cumstances "within a reasonable time of the alleged violation." 226 There is a
statutory recognition that delayed examinations hold little chance of producing
evidence corroborative or contradictory to the claims of the victim.2 27
The VAWA will be effective in bringing more science into claims of
sexual assault or sexual abuse during the acute phase. This will serve both the
interests of the victim and the defendant. More professional and complete ex-
aminations will dispense with the need for repeat examinations. The complain-
ing witness will have the benefit of a complete, thorough, professional examina-
tion that may be corroborative of her claim and the defendant will have availa-
ble to him a record of those examinations to be viewed by his own expert. This
will remove the victim from the cross-hairs of having to undergo repeat exami-
nations at the insistence of her alleged attacker. Yet, it will also serve the truth-
finding process of the trial by providing corroborative or dispositive medical
evidence to charges that are extremely serious for both the victim and the ac-
cused.
222 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2246 (1994). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266 (1994).
223 Id.
224 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-15 to -16 (2009).
225 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-16(c) (2009).
226 id.
227 W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-16(a)(3) (2009).
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VI. CONCLUSION
We are now left with a patchwork of different standards applied by the
states as to when a victim of sexual assault may be forced to undergo a physical
examination. This is unacceptable when one considers that the right at stake for
the victim arises under the United States Constitution. The fundamental right of
privacy and bodily integrity finds its roots in the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and should have a consistent and
uniform meaning throughout the states. It is often observed that the genius of
the federal system is that it allows experimentation by the states in developing
jurisprudence that may one day become the law of the land. The experimenta-
tion in the area of forced examinations of sexual assault victims has confounded
the issue more than illuminated it. Some states outright refuse to acknowledge
any interest of the accused that would justify a forced examination of the vic-
tim. Others permit it under standards as relaxed as a showing of an examination
being of material assistance to the defendant.
The probative value of any information that could be obtained by such
an examination is highly suspect. Not only do most states have statutes similar
to West Virginia that require only "slight penetration to justify a conviction for
sexual assault, the emerging medical science indicates that any examination
after the non-acute phase of the intercourse will not produce results helpful to
either side of the argument.
For those who desire more science and less passion in prosecutions for
sexual assault, especially where the stakes for both sides are so high, the Vi-
olence Against Women's Act is an important step forward. It will bring uni-
form standards to forensic medical examinations and will expand their availabil-
ity to all sexual assault victims. The evidence, materials, and results of such
examinations will be available to experts for the defendant so those concerned
about the truth-finding mission of the court system may have some of their fears
allayed.
The Violence Against Women's Act, however, is limited to those cir-
cumstances involving acute injury or those examinations that are done within a
medical timeframe that is reasonably connected to the date of the event. It will
not solve the issue in the context of delayed report cases.
To bring order and balance to this issue, the United States Supreme
Court must step in and define the boundaries of victims' and defendants' consti-
tutional rights.
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